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 Rechten van verdediging. Bosphorus-pre-
sumptie. Erkenning en tenuitvoerlegging bui-
tenlands vonnis niet in strijd met  art. 6 EVRM. 
 Klager is een Letse beleggingsadviseur. In 1999 leent 
hij een bedrag van 100.000 dollar van het in Cyprus 
gevestigde bedrijf F.H. Ltd, waarbij wordt overeen-
gekomen dat hij het bedrag, met rente, voor eind 
juni 1999 zal terugbetalen. Bij notariële akte wordt 
bepaald dat het Cypriotische recht van toepassing 
is op de leenovereenkomst en dat de Cypriotische 
rechter bevoegd is. In 2003 stelt F.H. een procedure 
tot terugbetaling in bij de Cypriotische rechter. Een 
dagvaarding wordt aangetekend verzonden naar 
het in de akte genoemde adres van klager in Riga, 
die verstek laat gaan. In 2004 wijst de rechtbank 
de vordering van F.H. toe en legt klager een terug-
betalingsverplichting op. In 2005 verzoekt F.H. de 
Letse rechter het Cypriotische vonnis ten uitvoer te 
leggen. De Letse rechtbank honoreert dit verzoek in 
2006 buiten aanwezigheid van de partijen. Volgens 
klager had de Letse rechtbank het Cypriotische von-
nis echter niet ten uitvoer mogen leggen, aangezien 
de procedure in Cyprus in allerlei opzichten tekort 
geschoten was. Hij besluit het Cypriotische von-
nis uit 2004 niet aan te vechten, maar gaat wel in 
beroep tegen het vonnis van de Letse rechtbank. In 
deze procedure gaat de Letse Hoge Raad uiteinde-
lijk over tot erkenning en tenuitvoerlegging van het 
Cypriotische vonnis uit 2004. De Hoge Raad merkt 
daarbij op dat klager dat vonnis niet tijdig heeft 
aangevochten bij de Cypriotische rechter en dat de 
Brussel I-verordening geen ruimte laat voor een in-
houdelijke beoordeling van het buitenlandse vonnis. 
 In 2007 dient klager een klacht in tegen Cyprus 
en Letland bij het EHRM. Cyprus zou aansprakelijk 
zijn voor een schending van  art. 6 EVRM, omdat de 
Cypriotische rechter had nagelaten hem op correcte 
wijze op te roepen en hem niet in de gelegenheid 
had gesteld zijn rechten van verdediging adequaat 
uit te oefenen. Ook Letland zou aansprakelijk zijn 
voor een schending van artikel 6 EVRM, omdat de 
Letse rechter uitvoering heeft gegeven aan het ge-
brekkige Cypriotische vonnis. 
 De klacht tegen Cyprus wordt in 2010 niet-ont-
vankelijk verklaard, omdat die te laat was ingediend 
(art. 35 lid 1 EHRM). In 2014 wijst een Kamer van 
het EHRM de tegen Letland gerichte klacht af. Kla-
ger verzoekt vervolgens om verwijzing van de zaak 
naar de Grote Kamer. 
 Het Hof stelt voorop dat het niet bevoegd is het 
Unierecht, waaronder de Brussel I-verordening, te 
interpreteren of toe te passen — dat is de taak van 
het Hof van Justitie van de Europese Unie en van de 
nationale rechters. 
 Het Hof overweegt vervolgens dat de zogenaam-
de Bosphorus-lijn geldt bij de nationale toepassing 
van het Unierecht: indien (1) de lidstaten zelf geen 
beoordelingsvrijheid hebben, en (2) het toezichtme-
chanisme waarin het Unierecht voorziet ten volle is 
ingezet, dan mag men ervan uitgaan dat fundamen-
tele rechten een gelijkwaardige bescherming genie-
ten in de EU-rechtsorde. 
 Aan de eerste voorwaarde is volgens het Hof in 
het onderhavige geval voldaan, nu  art. 34 lid 2 van 
de Brussel I-verordening de Letse rechter geen keuze 
liet: hij moest het Cypriotische vonnis ten uitvoer 
leggen. Het is waar dat art. 34 lid 1 van de veror-
dening de mogelijkheid openlaat om tenuitvoer-
legging te weigeren indien erkenning van het bui-
tenlandse vonnis duidelijk in strijd komt met eisen 
van openbare orde. Klager heeft zich voor de Letse 
rechter echter niet op deze bepaling beroepen, en 
het Hof acht het niet zijn taak om eigener beweging 
na te gaan of deze dan wel andere bepalingen van 
de verordening misschien van toepassing waren. 
 Wat betreft de tweede voorwaarde hecht het Hof 
er niet veel waarde aan dat de Letse rechter geen 
prejudiciële vraag heeft gesteld aan het Europese 
Hof van Justitie. Daartoe zal in veel gevallen geen 
aanleiding zijn, en klager had er ook niet om ver-
zocht. 
 De Bosphorus-presumptie is dus van toepassing. 
Vervolgens gaat het Hof na of deze presumptie in dit 
concrete geval wordt weerlegd doordat de gang van 
zaken heeft geresulteerd in een klaarblijkelijke mis-
kenning van de door het EVRM beschermde rechten. 
 In het onderhavige geval had klager zich ver-
zet tegen tenuitvoerlegging van het Cypriotische 
vonnis, omdat de procedure in Cyprus in allerlei 
opzichten tekort zou zijn geschoten. De Letse Hoge 
Raad heeft die klacht afgedaan met de overweging 
dat klager dat vonnis niet had aangevochten bij de 
Cypriotische rechter. Volgens het Hof had de Letse 
Hoge Raad echter zelf moeten controleren of klager 
het vonnis had kunnen aanvechten in Cyprus. Dat 
de Letse rechter dit heeft nagelaten, is betreurens-
waardig, maar het Hof hecht hieraan geen door-
slaggevend belang. De Cypriotische regering heeft 
namelijk desgevraagd te kennen gegeven — en dat is 
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door partijen ook niet betwist — dat er wel degelijk 
een rechtsgang voor klager had opengestaan. Klager 
had zich daarvan op de hoogte kunnen stellen, te-
meer daar hij willens en wetens een overeenkomst 
was aangegaan waarop Cypriotisch recht van toe-
passing was. Door het er maar bij te laten zitten 
heeft hij zelf bijgedragen aan het ontstaan van de 
situatie waarover hij nu klaagt. 
 Het Hof concludeert dat  art. 6 EVRM niet is ge-
schonden. 
 Avotiņš, 
 tegen  
 Letland 
 The law 
 Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention 
 69.  The applicant claimed to be the victim 
of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 
He complained that in issuing a declaration of 
enforceability in respect of the judgment of the 
Limassol District Court of 24 May 2004, which in 
his view was clearly defective as it had been given 
in breach of his defence rights, the Senate of the 
Latvian Supreme Court had infringed his right to 
a fair hearing. Article 6 § 1, in so far as relevant to 
the present case, provides: 
 “In the determination of his civil rights and 
obligations … everyone is entitled to a fair … 
hearing … by [a] … tribunal …” 
 A. Chamber judgment 
 70.  In its judgment the Chamber began by 
observing that, since the complaint against Cy-
prus had been declared inadmissible as being out 
of time (see paragraph 4 above), the Court did 
not have jurisdiction to determine whether the 
Limassol District Court had complied with Article 
6 § 1 of the Convention. The scope of the case was 
therefore confined to ascertaining whether, in or-
dering the enforcement of the Cypriot judgment 
in Latvia, the Latvian courts had observed the fun-
damental principles of a fair hearing within the 
meaning of that provision. In that connection the 
Chamber found that the observance by the State 
of its legal obligations arising out of membership 
of the European Union was a matter of general in-
terest and that this also applied to the implemen-
tation of the Brussels I Regulation, based on the 
principle of ‘mutual trust in the administration 
of justice’. The Latvian courts had therefore had 
a duty to ensure the recognition and rapid and 
effective enforcement of the Cypriot judgment 
in Latvia. The Chamber further observed that 
the protection of fundamental rights afforded by 
the European Union was in principle equivalent 
to that for which the Convention provided (see 
 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim 
Şirketi v. Ireland [GC], no. 45036/98, § 160–65, 
ECHR 2005-VI). 
 71.  The Chamber further considered that, 
having borrowed a sum of money from a Cypriot 
company and signed an acknowledgment of debt 
deed governed by Cypriot law and subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Cypriot courts, the applicant 
could have been expected to familiarise himself 
with the legal consequences of any failure on 
his part to repay the debt and with the manner 
in which any proceedings would be conducted 
in Cyprus. In the Chamber's view, the onus had 
been on the applicant to demonstrate that he had 
had no effective remedy in the Cypriot courts; 
however, he had not demonstrated this either be-
fore the Senate of the Latvian Supreme Court or 
before the Strasbourg Court. The Chamber there-
fore concluded that in dismissing the applicant's 
arguments simply by reference to the fact that he 
had not appealed against the Cypriot judgment, 
the Supreme Court had taken sufficient account 
of the rights protected by Article 6 § 1 of the Con-
vention. There had therefore been no violation of 
that provision in the present case. 
 72.  Lastly, the Chamber did not find any ap-
pearance of a violation with regard to the appli-
cant's other allegations under Article 6 § 1. 
 B. The parties' submissions 
 1. The applicant 
 73.  In his request for referral to the Grand 
Chamber and his oral pleadings at the hearing, 
the applicant put forward the following argu-
ments. He submitted at the outset that the pre-
sumption of equivalent protection (the ‘ Bospho-
rus presumption’) was inapplicable in the present 
case for two reasons. Firstly, under the Brussels I 
Regulation the higher courts in Latvia (the Regio-
nal Court and the Senate of the Supreme Court) 
had not been obliged automatically to recognise 
the Cypriot judgment. On the contrary, Articles 
34 and 35 of the Regulation had afforded them a 
broad margin of discretion to check that the ap-
plicant's fundamental procedural rights had been 
respected in the State of origin and to decide 
whether or not the judgment should be enforced 
in Latvia. To that extent, the Latvian courts had 
therefore retained full responsibility for ensuring 
compliance with the requirements of Article 6 
§ 1 of the Convention. Moreover, in declaring the 
judgment to be enforceable, the Senate of the Su-
preme Court had clearly breached the terms of 
Article 34(2) of the Regulation as interpreted by 
the CJEU. In that connection the applicant refer-
red to the CJEU's judgment in the  Trade Agency 
case (see paragraph 60 above) and to the sub-
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sequent rulings of the Senate of the Latvian Su-
preme Court. In two cases, the latter had carefully 
examined whether the defendants had been duly 
and promptly summoned to appear before the 
courts in the State of origin. In both cases, the 
defendants had not attempted to appeal against 
the judgments in question and the Senate had not 
criticised them on that account. 
 74.  Secondly, the present case was to be 
distinguished from the  Bosphorus case in so far 
as, in this case, the Senate of the Supreme Court 
had failed in its duty to consider requesting a 
preliminary ruling from the CJEU. The applicant 
acknowledged that he had never requested that 
such a ruling be sought, but argued that he had 
had no opportunity to do so since only the other 
party had been allowed to make submissions on 
the merits of the case at the hearing of 31 January 
2007. Hence, the Latvian courts had not made use 
of the review mechanisms existing in the Euro-
pean Union legal system. In the applicant's view, 
if the Latvian Supreme Court had requested a pre-
liminary ruling from the CJEU, the latter would 
most likely have indicated that it was empowe-
red to verify whether the applicant had been duly 
informed of the proceedings before the Cypriot 
court and whether it had been, or still was, open 
to him to appeal against the Cypriot judgment. 
The applicant referred in that connection to pa-
ragraph 38 of the  Trade Agency judgment, cited at 
paragraph 60 above. In his view, the present case 
was therefore more akin to the case of  Michaud 
v. France (no. 12323/11, § 112–115, ECHR 2012), 
in which the Court had found that the  Bosphorus 
presumption did not apply, for several reasons in-
cluding the one just cited. 
 75.  The applicant acknowledged that the 
observance by the State of its legal obligations 
arising out of membership of the European Uni-
on was a matter of general interest. However, it 
would be erroneous and inconsistent with the 
Court's settled case-law to find, as the Chamber 
had done in its judgment, that this reason alone 
constituted a legitimate aim sufficient to justify 
restricting the rights guaranteed by the Conven-
tion. In the Court's case-law, that objective had 
never been regarded as sufficient justification 
for interference with fundamental rights unless 
it was accompanied by other legitimate aims 
such as the prevention of crime (the applicant 
referred to  Michaud , cited above) or the protec-
tion of the rights of others (he referred to  Povse 
v. Austria (dec.), no. 3890/11, 18 June 2013). In the 
applicant's submission, since the Brussels I Regu-
lation had not required the Latvian authorities to 
enforce the Cypriot judgment automatically and 
unconditionally, the interference in question had 
not pursued any legitimate aim. 
 76.  In the applicant's view, his situation was 
fundamentally different from that in the  Orams 
case, which had been the subject of proceedings 
before both the CJEU (see paragraph 61 above) 
and the European Court of Human Rights (see 
 Orams v. Cyprus (dec.), no. 27841/07, 10 June 
2010). In that case, the applicants had been able 
to appeal against the impugned judgment. Their 
lawyer had been informed of the hearing before 
the Cypriot Supreme Court at which their appeal 
was to be examined and had actually appeared 
and pleaded his clients’ case. In Strasbourg, the 
applicants had complained only of the lack of 
written notice and the Court had found that the 
guarantees of Article 6 § 1 did not extend to re-
quiring written notice to be given. In the present 
case, by contrast, the applicant had never been 
served with the document instituting the pro-
ceedings. 
 77.  The applicant further submitted that, ha-
ving repaid his contractual debt of his own free 
will, he could not have expected that proceedings 
would be brought against him in Cyprus. The Se-
nate of the Latvian Supreme Court should have 
satisfied itself that the possibility of appealing 
against the impugned judgment in Cyprus exis-
ted in law and in fact, instead of placing the entire 
burden of proof on the applicant. In his submissi-
on, he should not be criticised for not attempting 
to appeal against the Cypriot judgment, for three 
reasons. Firstly, the judgment itself had contained 
no reference to the available judicial remedies. 
Secondly, placing such a burden of proof on him 
ran counter to the approach taken by the CJEU in 
the  ASML judgment, according to which ‘it [was] 
‘possible’ for a defendant to bring proceedings to 
challenge a default judgment against him only if 
he [was] in fact acquainted with its contents, be-
cause it was served on him in sufficient time to 
enable him to arrange for his defence before the 
courts of the State in which the judgment was gi-
ven’ (see paragraph 58 above). Thirdly, according 
to the information supplied by the Cypriot Gover-
nment, the possibility of an appeal lodged out of 
time being allowed in Cyprus was highly specu-
lative and was a matter for the court's discretion 
(see paragraph 68 above). Moreover, since the 
Riga Regional Court judgment of 2 October 2006 
refusing to declare the judgment enforceable had 
been in his favour (see paragraph 32 above), the 
applicant had had no reason to attempt to lodge 
an appeal in Cyprus at that point. 
 78.  In view of all the above considerations 
the applicant submitted that, in declaring the 
Cypriot judgment enforceable and refusing to 
examine his argument that he had not been duly 
notified of the examination of the case by the 
Cypriot court, the Latvian courts had failed to ob-
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domestic courts referred a question for a prelimi-
nary ruling only where they had doubts as to the 
correct interpretation or application of EU legisla-
tion. They were not required to do so if they found 
that the question raised was not relevant, that the 
provision in question had already been inter-
preted by the CJEU or that the correct application 
of EU law was so obvious as to leave no scope for 
reasonable doubt. That was precisely the situati-
on in the present case, as the CJEU's existing case-
law had been sufficiently explicit with regard to 
the meaning and scope of the requirements of 
Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation. More-
over, if the applicant had considered it necessary 
to obtain clarifications on that provision, he could 
have asked the Senate of the Supreme Court to re-
fer the matter to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. 
The fact that he had not done so was an indication 
that he had considered such a move to serve no 
purpose. 
 82.  The respondent Government added that, 
in rejecting the applicant's argument that he had 
not been duly informed of the proceedings on the 
sole ground that he had not challenged the Cypri-
ot judgment, the Senate of the Latvian Supreme 
Court had acted in full conformity with Article 
34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation as interpreted 
by the CJEU. The applicant had at no point alleged, 
still less proved, before the domestic courts or the 
Strasbourg Court that he had at least attempted to 
institute appeal proceedings in Cyprus. Moreover, 
it was reasonable to consider that in view of the 
six-month period that had elapsed between June 
2006 (when the applicant had been apprised of 
the content of the Cypriot judgment) and Janu-
ary 2007 (when the Senate of the Supreme Court 
had examined the case), the applicant had had 
sufficient time to lodge an appeal in Cyprus. On 
that point the respondent Government referred 
to the Cypriot Government's observations, from 
which it was clear that such a remedy had been 
available in theory and in practice and had not 
been subject to a strict time-limit (see paragraph 
68 above). They submitted that Article 34(2) of 
the Brussels I Regulation was based on the pre-
mise that any defects in a judgment given in de-
fault should be remedied in the country of origin. 
If the applicant had lodged an appeal with the 
Cypriot courts, the Latvian Supreme Court could 
have stayed or adjourned the enforcement pro-
ceedings in accordance with Articles 37(1) and 
46(1) of the Regulation. In omitting, without any 
real justification, to lodge such an appeal, the 
applicant had effectively prevented the Latvian 
courts from refusing enforcement of the judg-
ment. 
 83.  Observing that the applicant had been 
an investment consultant, the respondent Go-
serve the guarantees of a fair hearing, in breach of 
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 
 79.  Lastly — still from the standpoint of Ar-
ticle 6 § 1 — the applicant criticised the way in 
which the hearing of 31 January 2007 before the 
Senate of the Supreme Court had been conduc-
ted. He complained in particular that the prin-
ciple of equality of arms had not been respected 
and that the Senate had refused to provide him 
with a copy of the record of the hearing. 
 2. The respondent Government 
 80.  Unlike the applicant, the respondent Go-
vernment were of the view that the  Bosphorus 
presumption applied in the present case. Firstly, 
they submitted that the grounds for non-recog-
nition provided for in Article 34(2) of the Brussels 
I Regulation could not be interpreted as granting 
the court in the Member State in which enforce-
ment was sought a margin of discretion, as the 
grounds for refusing recognition were clearly set 
out in the text of that Article. Referring to the ex-
planatory memorandum concerning the propo-
sal for a Regulation (see paragraph 56 above) and 
to the CJEU's judgment in the case of  Apostolides 
v. Orams (see paragraph 60 above), the respon-
dent Government submitted that the legal form 
of a regulation had been expressly chosen by the 
European Union institutions in order not to leave 
any discretion to the Member States. The provi-
sions of the Regulation were autonomous and 
could not be interpreted or applied in the light 
of domestic law, and Article 34 had to be inter-
preted strictly since it constituted an obstacle to 
the attainment of one of the fundamental objec-
tives of the Regulation as a whole. Furthermore, 
the court with jurisdiction to rule on the enfor-
cement of the judgment in the Member State in 
question did not have any authority to review 
the possible grounds for non-enforcement on its 
own initiative. Consequently, the Senate of the 
Supreme Court had not enjoyed any discretion 
in deciding to recognise and enforce the Limassol 
District Court judgment. In so doing, it had simply 
complied with its strict obligations arising out of 
Latvia's membership of the European Union. 
 81.  Secondly, the respondent Government 
asserted that the sole fact that the Senate of the 
Supreme Court had not made full use of the re-
view mechanism provided for by EU law did not 
result in the rebuttal of the  Bosphorus presump-
tion. In their submission, the application of that 
presumption could not be made subject to a re-
quirement for the domestic courts to request a 
preliminary ruling from the CJEU in all cases wit-
hout exception, as this would run counter to the 
spirit of cooperation that must govern relations 
between the domestic courts and the CJEU. The 
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Article had been very carefully drafted and struck 
a balance between respect for the rights of the 
defence and the need to ensure, by simplifying 
the formalities, rapid and straightforward recog-
nition and enforcement in each Member State of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters ema-
nating from another Member State. The manner 
in which the provision in question was drafted 
left no discretion to the courts in the Member 
State in which enforcement was sought, especi-
ally since the abundant and clear case-law of the 
CJEU provided them with precise guidelines as 
to its application. For that reason, the application 
of the  Bosphorus presumption was not subject 
to a requirement for the courts of the Member 
States systematically to request a preliminary ru-
ling from the CJEU whenever Article 34(2) of the 
Brussels I Regulation was applicable. 
 87.  The Estonian Government attached con-
siderable weight to the fact that the two States 
concerned, Cyprus and Latvia, were Parties to 
the Convention and subject to the Court's juris-
diction. Accordingly, unlike in cases where the 
judgment to be enforced emanated from a third 
country, the court from which the declaration of 
enforceability was sought did not have to satisfy 
itself that the proceedings in the State of origin 
had generally conformed to the requirements of 
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Its review should 
be confined to the formalities of the enforcement 
proceedings, as it remained open to the defen-
dant to assert his or her Article 6 § 1 rights in the 
courts of the State of origin. 
 88.  In the Estonian Government's submis-
sion, where defendants against whom judgment 
had been given in default did not lodge an appeal 
against the judgment in question in the State of 
origin after they had been made aware of it, and 
failed to demonstrate that such a remedy would 
be impossible or ineffective, the court in the State 
in which enforcement was sought had no dis-
cretion, in examining an appeal in the context of 
the enforcement proceedings, to refuse the other 
party's request for recognition and enforcement. 
In view of the overall rationale behind Article 
34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation and the gene-
ral principles of civil procedure, it was reasonable 
for the burden of proof in that regard to be placed 
on the defendant. Article 34(2) of the Brussels I 
Regulation afforded individuals a standard of 
protection equivalent to that provided by Article 
6 § 1 of the Convention for the purposes of the 
 Bosphorus case-law, and thus required the State 
addressed to enforce the judgment as swiftly as 
possible. 
vernment further submitted that he should have 
known that failure to repay his debt would result 
in proceedings in the Cypriot courts and that the 
summons would be sent to the address indicated 
in the acknowledgment of debt deed. As the ap-
plicant had not provided his true address to the 
company with which he had entered into the 
loan agreement, his conduct might possibly be 
characterised as an abuse of rights for the purpo-
ses of Article 17 of the Convention. Furthermore, 
given that the applicant had consented to the ap-
plication of Cypriot law, he must be assumed to 
have been very familiar with the legal system in 
Cyprus, including the available remedies. Conse-
quently, his argument that the Cypriot judgment 
had contained no references to the available ju-
dicial remedies lacked any relevance, bearing in 
mind that neither the Brussels I Regulation, nor 
Cypriot law, nor Article 6 § 1 of the Convention 
required the courts to insert such a reference in 
their judgments. Hence, the situation of which 
the applicant complained before the Court had 
resulted essentially from his own conduct. 
 84.  The respondent Government submitted 
that one of the European Union's objectives was 
to secure the effective functioning of the com-
mon market. Attainment of and compliance with 
that objective, and mutual trust in the adminis-
tration of justice, constituted a general interest 
sufficient to justify certain restrictions on the 
right to a fair hearing, especially since the fairness 
of proceedings was also a fundamental principle 
of EU law recognised by the CJEU. Hence, the sys-
tem established by the Brussels I Regulation res-
pected the right to a fair hearing. Accordingly, and 
in the light of the  Bosphorus presumption, the res-
pondent Government requested the Court to find 
that the Senate of the Supreme Court had taken 
sufficient account of the applicant's rights under 
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 
 85.  Lastly, the respondent Government re-
jected the applicant's claims that the hearing of 
31 January 2007 had been conducted unfairly. In 
their submission, it was clear from the Supreme 
Court judgment that the applicant's lawyer had 
had an opportunity to make oral pleadings at 
the hearing. The reason why no record had been 
drawn up was that this was not required under 
domestic law in such a case. Furthermore, Article 
6 § 1 did not require the domestic courts to pro-
duce a written record of every hearing. 
 C. Observations of the third-party interveners 
 1. The Estonian Government 
 86.  The Estonian Government explained the 
ratio  legis behind Article 34 of the Brussels I Re-
gulation (as applicable at the material time). This 
T1_AB_1703_bw_V06.indd   113 1/13/2017   2:44:47 PM
AB 2017/17
114 Afl. 3 - 2017 AB
AB RECHTSPRAAK BESTUURSRECHT
Stylesheet: T1 V1.5
meant that the right to a fair hearing was gua-
ranteed not only during the stage of recognition 
and enforcement of a judgment but also earlier, at 
the stage of the court proceedings in the Member 
State of origin. Recognition and enforcement did 
not depend on whether the document instituting 
the proceedings had been served in accordance 
with the formal requirements, but rather on a 
specific examination of whether the defendant's 
right to adversarial process had in fact been res-
pected. The Commission further observed that 
Article 34 (1) of the Regulation provided for re-
cognition and enforcement to be refused where 
‘recognition [was] manifestly contrary to public 
policy in the Member State in which recognition 
[was] sought’. In the Commission's view, this pro-
vision afforded an even greater degree of protec-
tion of fundamental rights as it did not require an 
appeal to be lodged in the State of origin. 
 92.  The Commission submitted that in inter-
preting the conditions laid down in Article 34(2) 
of the Brussels I Regulation, the CJEU had been 
concerned to protect the right of defendants in 
default of appearance to a fair hearing. In parti-
cular, in its judgment in  ASML (cited at paragraph 
58 above), it had held that a defendant in default 
of appearance could be deemed to have been 
in a position to bring proceedings to challenge 
a judgment given against him only if he was in 
fact acquainted with its contents, which presup-
posed that it had been served on him. Simply 
being aware of the existence of a judgment was 
not sufficient in that regard. Hence, the existence 
or otherwise of remedies in the country of origin 
had to be assessed with reference to the point at 
which the defendant had actually been apprised 
of the content of the judgment as distinct from 
merely learning of its existence. It was true that 
Article 43 of the Brussels I Regulation did not 
require the court in which the declaration of en-
forceability was requested to automatically exa-
mine whether the circumstances enumerated in 
Article 34(2) applied, including the possibility of 
lodging an appeal in the State of origin. However, 
in the Commission's view, this had no bearing on 
compliance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, 
since in principle neither that provision nor Euro-
pean Union law governed the admissibility of evi-
dence and its assessment by the domestic courts. 
 93.  In sum, the European Commission sub-
mitted that, far from providing for ‘automatic’ re-
cognition and enforcement of judgments given in 
another Member State, the Brussels I Regulation 
made recognition and enforcement contingent 
on respect for the right to adversarial process and 
hence for the right to a fair hearing within the 
meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 
 2. The European Commission 
 89.  The European Commission submitted 
that the presumption of equivalent protection, 
known as the  Bosphorus presumption, was ap-
plicable in the present case. It confirmed that un-
der Article 45(1) of the Brussels I Regulation the 
court in which the declaration of enforceability 
was requested could refuse the request only on 
one of the grounds set forth in Articles 34 and 35 
of the Regulation. Hence, the courts of the Mem-
ber States could not exercise any discretion in 
ordering the enforcement of a judgment given 
in another Member State. Such an act fell strictly 
within the scope of the international legal obliga-
tions of the Member State in which enforcement 
was sought, arising out of its membership of the 
European Union. 
 90.  As to the fact that in the present case, as 
in the case of  Michaud (cited above), the domestic 
courts had not sought a preliminary ruling from 
the CJEU, the European Commission submitted 
that there was nevertheless one significant diffe-
rence between the two cases. In this case, unlike 
in  Michaud , it could not be said that the ‘full po-
tential of the [preliminary ruling] procedure’ had 
not been deployed, given that the applicant had 
not asked the courts in the respondent State to 
refer the question for a preliminary ruling or even 
raised any doubts as to the compatibility of the 
relevant provisions of European Union law with 
the Convention right whose violation he now al-
leged before the Court. The Commission further 
noted that a request for a preliminary ruling did 
not constitute a remedy to be exhausted for the 
purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In 
general terms, the Commission submitted that 
the application of the  Bosphorus presumption 
could not be made subject to a requirement for 
the courts of the EU Member States to seek a preli-
minary ruling from the CJEU whenever they were 
called on to apply the provisions of EU law. Even 
assuming that EU law imposed an obligation on 
the domestic court concerned to seek a prelimi-
nary ruling, failure to comply with that obligation 
should not be ‘penalised’ by a refusal on the part 
of the European Court of Human Rights to apply 
the presumption of equivalent protection. 
 91.  In the European Commission's view, the 
recognition and enforcement machinery establis-
hed by the Brussels I Regulation was compatible 
in itself with the right to a fair hearing protected 
by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Article 34(2) of 
the Regulation had to be read together with the 
other relevant provisions of the Regulation and 
with the Regulations on the service in the Mem-
ber States of judicial and extrajudicial documents 
in civil or commercial matters (see paragraph 66 
above). The combined effect of those provisions 
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 97.  The judgment of 24 May 2004 was given 
by a Cypriot court and the Latvian courts ordered 
its enforcement in Latvia. Consequently, the ap-
plicant's complaints under Article 6 of the Con-
vention as set out in his application concerned 
both the Cypriot proceedings and those in Latvia. 
With regard to the former, the applicant com-
plained that his defence rights had been infrin-
ged, while in the case of the latter he complained 
that the courts had validated the proceedings in 
Cyprus by ordering the recognition and enforce-
ment of the judgment. However, the Court decla-
red the complaint against Cyprus inadmissible 
as being out of time (partial decision of 3 March 
2010, see paragraph 4 above). At the present stage 
of the proceedings the application therefore con-
cerns Latvia alone. Accordingly, the Court does 
not have jurisdiction  ratione personae to give a 
formal ruling on whether the Limassol District 
Court complied with the requirements of Article 
6 § 1. However, it must ascertain whether, in de-
claring the Cypriot judgment to be enforceable, 
the Latvian courts acted in accordance with that 
provision (see,  mutatis mutandis, Pellegrini v. Italy , 
no. 30882/96, § 40–41, ECHR 2001-VIII). In doing 
so the Court cannot but have regard to the rele-
vant aspects of the proceedings in Cyprus. 
 98.  The Court considers that a decision to en-
force a foreign judgment cannot be regarded as 
compatible with the requirements of Article 6 § 1 
of the Convention if it was taken without the un-
successful party having been afforded any oppor-
tunity of effectively asserting a complaint as to 
the unfairness of the proceedings leading to that 
judgment, either in the State of origin or in the 
State addressed. In their third-party submissions 
the Estonian Government stressed the importan-
ce of the distinction between the enforcement of 
a judgment emanating from another Contracting 
Party to the Convention and that of a judgment 
given by the authorities of a State that was not a 
Party to the Convention. In the first case, where 
there was a presumption that the parties could 
secure protection of their Convention rights in 
the country of origin of the judgment, the re-
view by the court in the State addressed should 
be more limited than in the second case (see 
paragraph 87 above). The Court notes that it has 
never previously been called upon to examine 
observance of the guarantees of a fair hearing in 
the context of mutual recognition based on Euro-
pean Union law. However, it has always applied 
the general principle whereby a court examining 
a request for recognition and enforcement of a 
foreign judgment cannot grant the request wit-
hout first conducting some measure of review of 
that judgment in the light of the guarantees of a 
fair hearing; the intensity of that review may vary 
 3. The AIRE Centre 
 94.  The AIRE Centre stressed the need to 
safeguard the right to a fair hearing in the context 
of the procedure for the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments within the European Union, 
and the duty of the domestic courts to secure 
that right. A court hearing an appeal against the 
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judg-
ment could not confine its attention to verifying 
compliance with the formal requirements of Ar-
ticle 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation or (after 10 
June 2015) those of Article 45(1)(a) of the Brus-
sels I  bis Regulation. On the contrary, where the 
rights of the defence had been breached in the 
State of origin, the court could and should make 
use of Article 34(1) of the Brussels I Regulation 
or Article 45(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, 
according to which the request for recognition 
and enforcement had to be refused if ‘recognition 
[was] manifestly contrary to public policy in the 
Member State in which recognition [was] sought’. 
In the AIRE Centre's submission, if the court failed 
to do so it would be committing a manifest error 
of interpretation of European Union law. In other 
words, the court hearing the appeal had discreti-
on to refuse enforcement of the judgment if it had 
been given in breach of the rights of the defence. 
 95.  The AIRE Centre further submitted that 
the Court should review its current approach to 
the  Bosphorus presumption, especially in the light 
of the stance adopted by the CJEU in the  Melloni 
judgment and in Opinion 2/13 (see paragraphs 
47 and 49 above). It maintained in particular that 
the conclusions of Opinion 2/13, and especially of 
paragraph 192, were radically at odds with pro-
tection of the human rights guaranteed by the 
Convention. 
 D. The Court's assessment 
 1. Preliminary considerations 
 96.  The Court reiterates at the outset that, as 
regards disputes whose outcome is decisive for 
civil rights, Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is appli-
cable to the execution of foreign final judgments 
(see  McDonald v. France (dec.), no. 18648/04, 29 
April 2008;  Saccoccia v. Austria , no. 69917/01, 
§ 60–62, 18 December 2008; and  Sholokhov v. Ar-
menia and the Republic of Moldova , no. 40358/05, 
§ 66, 31 July 2012). It is not disputed that the Li-
massol District Court judgment of 24 May 2004, 
ordering the applicant to pay a contractual debt 
together with the corresponding interest and the 
costs and expenses in respect of the proceedings, 
concerned the substance of a ‘civil’ obligation on 
the part of the applicant. Article 6 § 1 is therefore 
applicable in the present case. 
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Article 6 § 1. Consequently, in the absence of any 
arbitrariness which would in itself raise an issue 
under Article 6 § 1, it is not for the Court to make a 
judgment as to whether the Senate of the Latvian 
Supreme Court correctly applied Article 34(2) of 
the Brussels I Regulation or any other provision of 
European Union law. 
 2. The presumption of equivalent protection 
(the Bosphorus presumption) 
 (a)  Scope of the presumption of equivalent 
protection 
 101.  The Court reiterates that, even when ap-
plying European Union law, the Contracting States 
remain bound by the obligations they freely ente-
red into on acceding to the Convention. However, 
those obligations must be assessed in the light of 
the presumption established by the Court in the 
 Bosphorus judgment and developed in  Michaud 
(both cited above; see also  M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece [GC], no. 30696/09, § 338, ECHR 2011, and 
Povse, cited above, § 76). In  Michaud , the Court 
summarised its case-law on this presumption in 
the following terms: 
 “102.  The Court reiterates that absolving 
the Contracting States completely from their 
Convention responsibility where they were 
simply complying with their obligations as 
members of an international organisation 
to which they had transferred a part of their 
sovereignty would be incompatible with the 
purpose and object of the Convention: the gu-
arantees of the Convention could be limited 
or excluded at will, thereby depriving it of its 
peremptory character and undermining the 
practical and effective nature of its safeguards. 
In other words, the States remain responsible 
under the Convention for the measures they 
take to comply with their international legal 
obligations, even when those obligations stem 
from their membership of an international 
organisation to which they have transferred 
part of their sovereignty (see  Bosphorus , cited 
above, § 154). 
 103.  It is true, however, that the Court has 
also held that action taken in compliance with 
such obligations is justified where the relevant 
organisation protects fundamental rights, as 
regards both the substantive guarantees of-
fered and the mechanisms controlling their 
observance, in a manner which can be consi-
dered at least equivalent — that is to say not 
identical but ‘comparable’ — to that for which 
the Convention provides (it being understood 
that any such finding of ‘equivalence’ could 
not be final and would be susceptible to re-
view in the light of any relevant change in fun-
depending on the nature of the case (see,  mutatis 
mutandis, Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain , 
26 June 1992, § 110, Series A no. 240, and  Pelle-
grini, cited above, § 40). In the present case the 
Court must therefore determine, in the light of 
the relevant circumstances of the case, whether 
the review conducted by the Senate of the Latvi-
an Supreme Court was sufficient for the purposes 
of Article 6 § 1. 
 99.  The Court emphasises that, in accordance 
with Article 19 of the Convention, its sole duty is 
to ensure the observance of the engagements 
undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the 
Convention. In particular, it is not its function to 
deal with errors of fact or law allegedly made by 
a national court in assessing the evidence before 
it, unless and in so far as they may have infringed 
rights and freedoms protected by the Convention 
(see, among many other authorities,  García Ruiz v. 
Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999-I). The 
Court cannot itself assess the facts which have 
led a national court to adopt one decision rather 
than another; otherwise, it would be acting as a 
court of fourth instance and would disregard the 
limits imposed on its action (see  Centro Europa 
7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, 
§ 197, ECHR 2012). Accordingly, it does not have 
jurisdiction to rule on issues of fact raised before 
it such as the applicant's claim that he had repaid 
his debt before the proceedings were instituted 
against him (see paragraphs 15 and 77 above). 
 100.  The Court further notes that the recog-
nition and enforcement of the Cypriot judgment 
took place in accordance with Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on ju-
risdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(known as the Brussels I Regulation), which was 
applicable at the relevant time. The applicant al-
leged that the Senate of the Supreme Court had 
breached Article 34(2) of that Regulation and 
the corresponding provision of the Latvian Ci-
vil Procedure Law. The Court reiterates that it is 
not competent to rule formally on compliance 
with domestic law, other international treaties 
or European Union law (see, for example,  S.J. v. 
Luxembourg , no. 34471/04, § 52, 4 March 2008, 
and  Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 12738/10, 
§ 110, 3 October 2014). The task of interpreting 
and applying the provisions of the Brussels I Re-
gulation falls firstly to the CJEU, in the context of a 
request for a preliminary ruling, and secondly to 
the domestic courts in their capacity as courts of 
the Union, that is to say, when they give effect to 
the Regulation as interpreted by the CJEU. The ju-
risdiction of the European Court of Human Rights 
is limited to reviewing compliance with the re-
quirements of the Convention, in this case with 
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ness of Community acts and that the CJEU refer-
red extensively to Convention provisions and to 
Strasbourg case-law in carrying out its assess-
ment (see  Bosphorus , cited above, § 159). This fin-
ding has applied  a fortiori since 1 December 2009, 
the date of entry into force of Article 6 (amended) 
of the Treaty on European Union, which confers 
on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Eu-
ropean Union the same value as the Treaties and 
gives fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
Convention and as they result from the constitu-
tional traditions common to the Member States, 
the status of general principles of European Uni-
on law (see  Michaud , cited above, § 106). 
 103.  The Court found the substantive protec-
tion afforded by EU law to be equivalent taking 
into account the provisions of Article 52(3) of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, according 
to which, in so far as the rights contained in the 
Charter correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention, their meaning and scope are the 
same, without prejudice to the possibility for 
EU law to provide more extensive protection 
(see  Bosphorus , cited above, § 80). In examining 
whether, in the case before it, it can still consider 
that the protection afforded by EU law is equiva-
lent to that for which the Convention provides, 
the Court is especially mindful of the importance 
of compliance with the rule laid down in Article 
52(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights given 
that the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon 
(see paragraph 37 above) conferred on the Char-
ter the same legal value as the Treaties. 
 104.  Secondly, the Court has recognised that 
the mechanism provided for by European Union 
law for supervising observance of fundamental 
rights, in so far as its full potential has been de-
ployed, also affords protection comparable to that 
for which the Convention provides. On this point, 
the Court has attached considerable importance 
to the role and powers of the CJEU, despite the 
fact that individual access to that court is far more 
limited than access to the Strasbourg Court under 
Article 34 of the Convention (see the judgments 
in  Bosphorus , § 160-65, and  Michaud , § 106-11, 
both cited above). 
 (b)  Application of the presumption of equiva-
lent protection in the present case 
 105.  The Court reiterates that the application 
of the presumption of equivalent protection in 
the legal system of the European Union is sub-
ject to two conditions, which it set forth in the 
 Michaud judgment, cited above. These are the ab-
sence of any margin of manoeuvre on the part of 
the domestic authorities and the deployment of 
the full potential of the supervisory mechanism 
provided for by European Union law (ibid., § 113-
damental rights protection). If such equivalent 
protection is considered to be provided by the 
organisation, the presumption will be that a 
State has not departed from the requirements 
of the Convention when it does no more than 
implement legal obligations flowing from its 
membership of the organisation. 
 However, a State will be fully responsible un-
der the Convention for all acts falling outside 
its strict international legal obligations, no-
tably where it has exercised State discretion 
(see  M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece , cited above, 
§ 338). In addition, any such presumption can 
be rebutted if, in the circumstances of a parti-
cular case, it is considered that the protection 
of Convention rights was manifestly deficient. 
In such cases, the interest of international coo-
peration would be outweighed by the Con-
vention's role as a ‘constitutional instrument 
of European public order’ in the field of hu-
man rights (see  Bosphorus , cited above, § 152-
58, and also, among other authorities,  M.S.S. v. 
Belgium and Greece , cited above, § 338-40). 
 104.  This presumption of equivalent pro-
tection is intended, in particular, to ensure 
that a State Party is not faced with a dilemma 
when it is obliged to rely on the legal obliga-
tions incumbent on it as a result of its mem-
bership of an international organisation which 
is not party to the Convention and to which it 
has transferred part of its sovereignty, in order 
to justify its actions or omissions arising from 
such membership  vis-à-vis the Convention. It 
also serves to determine in which cases the 
Court may, in the interests of international 
cooperation, reduce the intensity of its super-
visory role, as conferred on it by Article 19 of 
the Convention, with regard to observance by 
the States Parties of their engagements arising 
from the Convention. It follows from these 
aims that the Court will accept such an arran-
gement only where the rights and safeguards 
it protects are given protection comparable to 
that afforded by the Court itself. Failing that, 
the State would escape all international re-
view of the compatibility of its actions with its 
Convention commitments.” 
 102.  In the context of the former ‘first pillar’ 
of the EU (see  Bosphorus , cited above, § 72), the 
Court held that the protection of fundamental 
rights afforded by the legal system of the Euro-
pean Union was in principle equivalent to that 
for which the Convention provided. In arriving at 
that conclusion it found, firstly, that the European 
Union offered equivalent protection of the sub-
stantive guarantees, observing in that connection 
that at the relevant time respect for fundamental 
rights had already been a condition of the lawful-
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According to the AIRE Centre this provision allo-
wed the Latvian court a degree of discretion (see 
paragraph 94 above). However, the arguments 
raised by the applicant before the Supreme Court 
were confined to the application of paragraph 2 
of Article 34. The Court will therefore confine its 
analysis to the applicant's complaints as raised 
before the Supreme Court and in the context of 
the present proceedings. It considers that it is not 
its task to determine whether another provision 
of the Brussels I Regulation should have been ap-
plied. 
 109.  As regards the second condition, na-
mely the deployment of the full potential of the 
supervisory mechanism provided for by Euro-
pean Union law, the Court observes at the out-
set that in the  Bosphorus judgment, cited above, 
it recognised that, taken overall, the supervisory 
mechanisms put in place within the European 
Union afforded a level of protection equivalent 
to that for which the Convention mechanism 
provided (ibid., § 160-64). Turning to the specific 
circumstances of the present case, it notes that 
the Senate of the Supreme Court did not request 
a preliminary ruling from the CJEU regarding the 
interpretation and application of Article 34(2) of 
the Regulation. However, it considers that this 
second condition should be applied without ex-
cessive formalism and taking into account the 
specific features of the supervisory mechanism in 
question. It considers that it would serve no use-
ful purpose to make the implementation of the 
 Bosphorus presumption subject to a requirement 
for the domestic court to request a ruling from 
the CJEU in all cases without exception, including 
those cases where no genuine and serious issue 
arises with regard to the protection of fundamen-
tal rights by EU law, or those in which the CJEU 
has already stated precisely how the applicable 
provisions of EU law should be interpreted in a 
manner compatible with fundamental rights. 
 110.  The Court observes that, in a different 
context, it has held that national courts against 
whose decisions no judicial remedy exists in na-
tional law are obliged to give reasons for refusing 
to refer a question to the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling, in the light of the exceptions provided for 
by the case-law of the CJEU. The national courts 
must therefore state the reasons why they con-
sider it unnecessary to seek a preliminary ruling 
(see  Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek v. Belgium , 
nos. 3989/07 and 38353/07, § 62, 20 September 
2011, and  Dhahbi v. Italy , no. 17120/09, § 31–34, 8 
April 2014). The Court emphasises that the pur-
pose of the review it conducts in this regard is to 
ascertain whether the refusal to refer a question 
for a preliminary ruling constituted in itself a vi-
olation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention; in so 
15). The Court must therefore ascertain whether 
these two conditions were satisfied in the present 
case. 
 106.  With regard to the first condition, the 
Court notes at the outset that the provision to 
which the Senate of the Supreme Court gave ef-
fect was contained in a Regulation, which was 
directly applicable in the Member States in its 
entirety, and not in a Directive, which would have 
been binding on the State with regard to the re-
sult to be achieved but would have left it to the 
State to choose the means and manner of achie-
ving it (see, conversely,  Michaud , cited above, 
§ 113). As to the precise provision applied in the 
instant case, namely Article 34(2) of the Brus-
sels I Regulation, the Court notes that it allowed 
the refusal of recognition or enforcement of a 
foreign judgment only within very precise limits 
and subject to certain preconditions, namely that 
‘the defendant [had] not [been] served with the 
document which instituted the proceedings or 
with an equivalent document in sufficient time 
and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for 
his defence, unless the defendant [had] failed to 
commence proceedings to challenge the judg-
ment when it [had been] possible for him to do 
so’. It is clear from the interpretation given by the 
CJEU in a fairly extensive body of case-law (see 
paragraphs 57–61 above) that this provision did 
not confer any discretion on the court from which 
the declaration of enforceability was sought. The 
Court therefore concludes that the Senate of the 
Latvian Supreme Court did not enjoy any margin 
of manoeuvre in this case. 
 107.  The present case is therefore distinguis-
hable from that of  M.S.S. , cited above. In that case, 
in examining the issue of Belgium's responsibility 
under the Convention, the Court noted that, un-
der the terms of the applicable Regulation (the 
Dublin II Regulation), the Belgian State authori-
ties retained the discretionary power to decide 
whether or not to make use of the ‘sovereignty’ 
clause which allowed them to examine the asy-
lum application and to refrain from sending the 
applicant back to Greece if they considered that 
the Greek authorities were likely not to fulfil their 
obligations under the Convention (§ 339-40). By 
contrast, Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation 
did not grant States any such discretionary po-
wers of assessment. 
 108.  In its third-party submissions the AIRE 
Centre argued that the Senate of the Latvian Su-
preme Court could and should have had recourse 
to Article 34(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, ac-
cording to which the request for a declaration of 
enforceability had to be refused if ‘recognition 
[was] manifestly contrary to public policy in the 
Member State in which recognition [was] sought’. 
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by observance of the Convention as a ‘constituti-
onal instrument of European public order’ in the 
field of human rights (see  Bosphorus , § 156, and 
 Michaud , § 103, both cited above). In examining 
this issue the Court must have regard both to 
Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation as such 
and to the specific circumstances in which it was 
implemented in the present case. 
 3. Allegation that the protection of the 
rights guaranteed by the Convention was 
manifestly deficient 
 (a)  General remarks on mutual recognition 
 113.  In general terms, the Court observes 
that the Brussels I Regulation is based in part on 
mutual recognition mechanisms which themsel-
ves are founded on the principle of mutual trust 
between the Member States of the European 
Union. The Preamble to the Brussels I Regulation 
states that the approach underpinning the Regu-
lation is one of ‘mutual trust in the administra-
tion of justice’ within the EU, which implies that 
‘the declaration that a judgment is enforceable 
should be issued virtually automatically after 
purely formal checks of the documents supplied, 
without there being any possibility for the court 
to raise of its own motion any of the grounds for 
non-enforcement provided for by this Regulation’ 
(see paragraph 54 above). The Court is mindful of 
the importance of the mutual recognition mecha-
nisms for the construction of the area of freedom, 
security and justice referred to in Article 67 of the 
TFEU, and of the mutual trust which they require. 
As stated in Articles 81(1) and 82(1) of the TFEU, 
the mutual recognition of judgments is designed 
in particular to facilitate effective judicial coo-
peration in civil and criminal matters. The Court 
has repeatedly asserted its commitment to inter-
national and European cooperation (see, among 
other authorities,  Waite and Kennedy v. Germany 
[GC], no. 26083/94, § 63 and 72, ECHR 1999-I, and 
 Bosphorus , cited above, § 150). Hence, it considers 
the creation of an area of freedom, security and 
justice in Europe, and the adoption of the means 
necessary to achieve it, to be wholly legitimate in 
principle from the standpoint of the Convention. 
 114.  Nevertheless, the methods used to cre-
ate that area must not infringe the fundamental 
rights of the persons affected by the resulting me-
chanisms, as indeed confirmed by Article 67(1) of 
the TFEU. However, it is apparent that the aim of 
effectiveness pursued by some of the methods 
used results in the review of the observance of 
fundamental rights being tightly regulated or 
even limited. Hence, the CJEU stated recently in 
Opinion 2/13 that ‘when implementing EU law, 
the Member States may, under EU law, be re-
doing, it takes into account the approach already 
established by the case-law of the CJEU. This 
review therefore differs from that which it con-
ducts when, as in the present case, it examines 
the decision not to request a preliminary ruling 
as part of its overall assessment of the degree of 
protection of fundamental rights afforded by Eu-
ropean Union law. The Court carries out this as-
sessment, in line with the case-law established in 
 Michaud , in order to determine whether it can ap-
ply the presumption of equivalent protection to 
the decision complained of, a presumption which 
the Court applies in accordance with conditions 
which it has itself laid down. 
 111.  The Court thus considers that the ques-
tion whether the full potential of the supervisory 
mechanisms provided for by European Union law 
was deployed — and, more specifically, whether 
the fact that the domestic court hearing the case 
did not request a preliminary ruling from the 
CJEU is apt to preclude the application of the pre-
sumption of equivalent protection — should be 
assessed in the light of the specific circumstances 
of each case. In the present case it notes that the 
applicant did not advance any specific argument 
concerning the interpretation of Article 34(2) of 
the Brussels I Regulation and its compatibility 
with fundamental rights such as to warrant a fin-
ding that a preliminary ruling should have been 
requested from the CJEU. This position is confir-
med by the fact that the applicant did not sub-
mit any request to that effect to the Senate of the 
Latvian Supreme Court. The present case is thus 
clearly distinguishable from  Michaud , cited abo-
ve, in which the national supreme court refused 
the applicant's request to seek a preliminary ru-
ling from the CJEU even though the issue of the 
Convention compatibility of the impugned provi-
sion of European Union law had never previously 
been examined by the CJEU (ibid., § 114). Hence, 
the fact that the matter was not referred for a pre-
liminary ruling is not a decisive factor in the pre-
sent case. The second condition for application of 
the  Bosphorus presumption should therefore be 
considered to be satisfied. 
 112.  In view of the foregoing considerations, 
the Court concludes that the presumption of 
equivalent protection is applicable in the present 
case, as the Senate of the Supreme Court did no 
more than implement Latvia's legal obligations 
arising out of its membership of the European 
Union (see,  mutatis mutandis, Povse , cited above, 
§ 78). Accordingly, the Court's task is confined to 
ascertaining whether the protection of the rights 
guaranteed by the Convention was manifestly 
deficient in the present case such that this pre-
sumption is rebutted. In that case, the interest of 
international cooperation would be outweighed 
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In this spirit, where the courts of a State which is 
both a Contracting Party to the Convention and a 
Member State of the European Union are called 
upon to apply a mutual recognition mechanism 
established by EU law, they must give full effect 
to that mechanism where the protection of Con-
vention rights cannot be considered manifestly 
deficient. However, if a serious and substantiated 
complaint is raised before them to the effect that 
the protection of a Convention right has been ma-
nifestly deficient and that this situation cannot be 
remedied by European Union law, they cannot re-
frain from examining that complaint on the sole 
ground that they are applying EU law. 
 (b)  Whether the protection of fundamental 
rights was manifestly deficient in the pre-
sent case 
 117.  The Court must now seek to ascertain 
whether the protection of fundamental rights 
afforded by the Senate of the Latvian Supreme 
Court was manifestly deficient in the present case 
such that the presumption of equivalent protec-
tion is rebutted, as regards both the provision of 
European Union law that was applied and its im-
plementation in the specific case of the applicant. 
 118.  The Court considers that the requirement 
to exhaust remedies arising from the mechanism 
provided for by Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Re-
gulation as interpreted by the CJEU (the defen-
dant must have made use of any remedies avai-
lable in the State of origin in order to be able to 
complain of a failure to serve him with the docu-
ment instituting the proceedings), is not in itself 
problematic in terms of the guarantees of Article 
6 § 1 of the Convention. This is a precondition 
which pursues the aim of ensuring the proper 
administration of justice in a spirit of procedu-
ral economy and which is based on an approach 
similar to that underpinning the rule of exhaus-
tion of domestic remedies set forth in Article 35 
§ 1 of the Convention. This approach comprises 
two strands. Firstly, States are dispensed from 
answering before an international body for their 
acts before they have had an opportunity to put 
matters right through their own legal system and, 
secondly, it is presumed that there is an effective 
remedy available in the domestic system in res-
pect of the alleged breach (see,  mutatis mutandis, 
Akdivar and Others v. Turkey , 16 September 1996, 
§ 65,  Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, 
and  Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], no. 40167/06, 
§ 115, ECHR 2015). Hence, the Court sees no in-
dication that the protection afforded was mani-
festly deficient in this regard. 
 119.  However, the Court emphasises that the 
adversarial principle and the principle of equality 
of arms, which are closely linked, are fundamen-
quired to presume that fundamental rights have 
been observed by the other Member States, so 
that …, save in exceptional cases, they may not 
check whether that other Member State has actu-
ally, in a specific case, observed the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the EU’ (see paragraph 49 
above). Limiting to exceptional cases the power 
of the State in which recognition is sought to re-
view the observance of fundamental rights by the 
State of origin of the judgment could, in practice, 
run counter to the requirement imposed by the 
Convention according to which the court in the 
State addressed must at least be empowered to 
conduct a review commensurate with the gravity 
of any serious allegation of a violation of funda-
mental rights in the State of origin, in order to 
ensure that the protection of those rights is not 
manifestly deficient. 
 115.  Moreover, the Court observes that where 
the domestic authorities give effect to European 
Union law and have no discretion in that regard, 
the presumption of equivalent protection set 
forth in the  Bosphorus judgment is applicable. 
This is the case where the mutual recognition 
mechanisms require the court to presume that 
the observance of fundamental rights by another 
Member State has been sufficient. The domes-
tic court is thus deprived of its discretion in the 
matter, leading to automatic application of the 
 Bosphorus presumption of equivalence. The Court 
emphasises that this results, paradoxically, in a 
twofold limitation of the domestic court's review 
of the observance of fundamental rights, due to 
the combined effect of the presumption on which 
mutual recognition is founded and the  Bosphorus 
presumption of equivalent protection. 
 116.  In the  Bosphorus judgment the Court rei-
terated that the Convention is a ‘constitutional in-
strument of European public order’ (ibid., § 156). 
Accordingly, the Court must satisfy itself, where 
the conditions for application of the presumption 
of equivalent protection are met (see paragraphs 
105–106 above), that the mutual recognition 
mechanisms do not leave any gap or particular 
situation which would render the protection of 
the human rights guaranteed by the Convention 
manifestly deficient. In doing so it takes into ac-
count, in a spirit of complementarity, the manner 
in which these mechanisms operate and in parti-
cular the aim of effectiveness which they pursue. 
Nevertheless, it must verify that the principle of 
mutual recognition is not applied automatically 
and mechanically (see,  mutatis mutandis, X v. Lat-
via [GC], no. 27853/09, § 98 and 107, ECHR 2013) 
to the detriment of fundamental rights — which, 
the CJEU has also stressed, must be observed in 
this context (see, for instance, its judgment in  Alp-
ha Bank Cyprus Ltd , cited at paragraph 48 above). 
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the applicant, as it did in its judgment of 31 Janu-
ary 2007, for not appealing against the judgment 
concerned, and to remain silent on the issue of 
the burden of proof with regard to the existence 
and availability of a remedy in the State of origin; 
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, like Article 34(2) 
 in fine of the Brussels I Regulation, required it to 
verify that this condition was satisfied, in the 
absence of which it could not refuse to examine 
the applicant's complaint. The Court considers 
that the determination of the burden of proof, 
which, as the European Commission stressed 
(see paragraph 92 above), is not governed by Eu-
ropean Union law, was therefore decisive in the 
present case. Hence, that point should have been 
examined in adversarial proceedings leading to 
reasoned findings. However, the Supreme Court 
tacitly presumed either that the burden of proof 
lay with the defendant or that such a remedy 
had in fact been available to the applicant. This 
approach, which reflects a literal and automatic 
application of Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Re-
gulation, could in theory lead to a finding that the 
protection afforded was manifestly deficient such 
that the presumption of equivalent protection of 
the rights of the defence guaranteed by Article 6 
§ 1 is rebutted. Nevertheless, in the specific cir-
cumstances of the present application the Court 
does not consider this to be the case, although 
this shortcoming is regrettable. 
 122.  It is clear, in fact, from the information 
provided by the Cypriot Government at the Grand 
Chamber's request, and not disputed by the par-
ties, that Cypriot law afforded the applicant, after 
he had learned of the existence of the judgment, 
a perfectly realistic opportunity of appealing des-
pite the length of time that had elapsed since the 
judgment had been given. In accordance with 
Cypriot legislation and case-law, where a defen-
dant against whom a judgment has been given 
in default applies to have that judgment set aside 
and alleges, on arguable grounds, that he or she 
was not duly summoned before the court which 
gave judgment, the court hearing the application 
is required — and not merely empowered — to 
set aside the judgment given in default (see pa-
ragraph 68 above). Accordingly, the Court is not 
convinced by the applicant's argument that such 
a procedure would have been bound to fail. The 
Court has consistently held that if there is any 
doubt as to whether a given remedy offers a real 
chance of success, that point must be submitted 
to the domestic courts (see, for example,  Akdivar 
and Others , cited above, § 71, and  Naydenov v. Bul-
garia , no. 17353/03, § 50, 26 November 2009). In 
the instant case the Court considers that, in the 
period between 16 June 2006 (the date on which 
he was given access to the entire case file at the 
tal components of the concept of a ‘fair hearing’ 
within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Con-
vention. They require a ‘fair balance’ between the 
parties: each party must be afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to present his case under conditi-
ons that do not place him at a substantial dis-
advantage  vis-à-vis his opponent or opponents 
(see, for example,  Gorraiz Lizarraga and Others v. 
Spain , no. 62543/00, § 56, ECHR 2004-III). These 
principles, which cover all aspects of procedural 
law in the Contracting States, are also applicable 
in the specific sphere of service of judicial docu-
ments on the parties (see  Miholapa v. Latvia , no. 
61655/00, § 23, 31 May 2007, and  Övüş v. Turkey , 
no. 42981/04, § 47, 13 October 2009), although 
Article 6 § 1 cannot be interpreted as prescribing 
a specific form of service of documents (see the 
decision in  Orams , cited above). 
 120.  Turning to the present case the Court 
notes that the applicant maintained, in parti-
cular, before the Latvian courts that he had not 
been duly notified in good time of the summons 
to appear before the Limassol District Court and 
the request by the company F.H. Ltd., with the 
result that he had been unable to arrange for his 
defence. He therefore argued that recognition of 
the impugned judgment should have been re-
fused under Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regula-
tion. The applicant contended that the summons 
had been sent to an address where it had been 
physically impossible to reach him, even though 
the Cypriot and Latvian lawyers representing 
the claimant company had been perfectly aware 
of his business address in Riga and could easily 
have obtained his private address (see paragraph 
30 above). He therefore raised cogent arguments 
in the Latvian courts alleging the existence of a 
procedural defect which,  a priori , was contrary to 
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and precluded the 
enforcement of the Cypriot judgment in Latvia. 
 121.  In the light of the general principles 
reiterated above, the Court notes that, in the 
proceedings before the Senate of the Supreme 
Court, the applicant complained that he had not 
received any summons or been notified of the 
Cypriot judgment. In so doing he relied on the 
grounds for non-recognition provided for by Ar-
ticle 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation. That pro-
vision states expressly that such grounds may be 
invoked only on condition that proceedings have 
previously been commenced to challenge the 
judgment in question, in so far as it was possible 
to do so. The fact that the applicant relied on that 
Article without having challenged the judgment 
as required necessarily raised the question of the 
availability of that legal remedy in Cyprus in the 
circumstances of the present case. In such a situa-
tion the Senate was not entitled simply to criticise 
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no appearance of a violation of the rights secured 
under that provision. 
 127.  Accordingly, there has been no violation 
of Article 6 § 1. 
 For these reasons, the Court 
 Holds , by sixteen votes to one, that there has been 
no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 
 Noot 
 1. Deze uitspraak brengt verdere verduide-
lijking en verfijning in de verhouding tussen het 
EU-recht en het EVRM. Meer specifiek met be-
trekking tot de situaties waarin het EU-recht lid-
staten een bepaalde verplichting (zonder beleids-
vrijheid) oplegt waartegen een betrokken partij 
opkomt met een beroep op het EVRM. Daarbij 
gaat het om zaken die zowel bij het EHRM als het 
Hof van Justitie van de EU terecht kunnen komen 
met het potentiële risico van tegenstrijdige recht-
spraak. Dit gevaar had moeten worden bezworen 
met een toetreding van de EU tot het EVRM. Deze 
toetreding lijkt er vooralsnog echter niet van te 
komen als gevolg van een negatief advies van het 
HvJ EU (Opinion 2/13). Saillant daarin was onder 
meer dat het HvJ EU als een van de argumenten 
tegen toetreding naar voren bracht dat er situa-
ties zijn waarin het EU-recht en dan met name 
de vier verkeersvrijheden moeten kunnen blijven 
prevaleren boven EVRM-rechten, in het bijzonder 
omdat er van uit moet worden gegaan dat andere 
EU-lidstaten in zaken van uitlevering of zoals in 
casu erkenning van rechterlijke uitspraken in 
beginsel fundamentele rechten respecteren (het 
systeem van wederzijdse erkenning). Het EHRM 
grijpt de hier opgenomen uitspraak aan om mede 
in het licht van dat argument de verhouding met 
het EU-recht nog een keer te (her)ijken. Centrale 
boodschap: er is genoeg ruimte voor wederzijds 
vertrouwen, maar nationale rechters moeten al-
tijd kritisch blijven nagaan of er geen reden is aan 
te nemen dat in een concrete casus toch EVRM-
rechten in het gedrang komen. Geen vrijbrief 
voor de toepassing van EU-recht dus maar wel 
voldoende praktische manoeuvreerruimte voor 
het systeem van de EU. 
 2. De verhouding tussen het EU-recht en 
het EVRM wordt — als bekend — geregeerd door 
de bekende Bosphorus-doctrine. Ten aanzien 
van de EU gaat het Hof er vanuit dat daarbin-
nen in beginsel een met het EVRM equivalente 
mensenrechtenbescherming aanwezig is om 
welke reden klachten tegen lidstaten van de EU, 
tevens partij bij het EVRM, over het optreden van 
deze organisatie dan wel lidstaten die zonder 
eigen beoordelingsmarge uitvoering geven aan 
premises of the first-instance court and was able 
to acquaint himself with the content of the Cy-
priot judgment) and 31 January 2007 (the date of 
the hearing of the Senate of the Supreme Court), 
the applicant had sufficient time to pursue a re-
medy in the Cypriot courts. However, for reasons 
known only to himself, he made no attempt to do 
so. 
 123.  The fact that the Cypriot judgment made 
no reference to the available remedies does not 
affect the Court's findings. It is true that section 
230(1) of the Latvian Civil Procedure Law requires 
the courts to indicate in the text of their decisions 
the detailed arrangements and time-limits for 
appealing against them (see paragraph 67 above). 
However, while such a requirement is laudable in 
so far as it affords an additional safeguard which 
facilitates the exercise of litigants' rights, its exis-
tence cannot be inferred from Article 6 § 1 of 
the Convention (see  Société Guérin Automobiles 
v. the 15 States of the European Union (dec.), no. 
51717/99, 4 July 2000). It was therefore up to the 
applicant himself, if need be with appropriate 
advice, to enquire as to the remedies available in 
Cyprus after he became aware of the judgment in 
question. 
 124.  On this point the Court shares the view 
of the respondent Government that the appli-
cant, who was an investment consultant, should 
have been aware of the legal consequences of 
the acknowledgment of debt deed which he had 
signed. That deed was governed by Cypriot law, 
concerned a sum of money borrowed by the ap-
plicant from a Cypriot company and contained 
a clause conferring jurisdiction on the Cypriot 
courts. Accordingly, the applicant should have 
ensured that he was familiar with the manner in 
which possible proceedings would be conducted 
before the Cypriot courts (see,  mutatis mutandis, 
Robba v. Germany , no. 20999/92, Commission de-
cision of 28 February 1996, unpublished). Having 
omitted to obtain information on the subject he 
contributed to a large extent, as a result of his 
inaction and lack of diligence, to bringing about 
the situation of which he complained before the 
Court and which he could have prevented so as to 
avoid incurring any damage (see,  mutatis mutan-
dis, Hussin v. Belgium (dec.), no. 70807/01, 6 May 
2004, and  McDonald, cited above). 
 125.  Hence, in the specific circumstances of 
the present case, the Court does not consider that 
the protection of fundamental rights was ma-
nifestly deficient such that the presumption of 
equivalent protection is rebutted. 
 126.  Lastly, as regards the applicant's other 
complaints under Article 6 § 1, and in so far as it 
has jurisdiction to rule on them, the Court finds 
T1_AB_1703_bw_V06.indd   122 1/13/2017   2:44:48 PM
AB 2017/17
123Afl. 3 - 2017AB
AB RECHTSPRAAK BESTUURSRECHT
Stylesheet: T1 V1.5
er moet geen sprake zijn van  excessive formalism . 
In casu heeft de klager in Letland noch in Straats-
burg de kwestie van interpretatie van de relevan-
te EU-bepaling naar voren gebracht en heeft de 
Letse rechter terecht geen aanleiding gezien een 
prejudiciële vraag te stellen. Dat zou kunnen wor-
den gezien als een nadere uitleg van de hiervoor 
genoemde uitspraak inzake  Michaud . 
 5. De belangrijkste waarde van de hier op-
genomen uitspraak zit echter in het signaal dat 
het EHRM aan zijn Luxemburgse collega afgeeft, 
namelijk dat het belangrijke EU-beginsel van 
wederzijds vertrouwen (in dit geval bij de weder-
zijdse erkenning van elkaars nationale vonnissen) 
in algemene zin door de beugel kan, maar dat dit 
er niet toe mag leiden dat de nationale rechter 
daarmee zonder meer aanneemt dat het wel 
goed zit met de grondrechtenbescherming. De 
nationale rechter zal zo nodig in lijn met de nog 
steeds recht overeind staande Bosphorus-doctri-
ne moeten toetsten (althans als aan de twee hie-
voor genoemde voorwaarden is voldaan) of spra-
ke is van manifeste gebreken in de bescherming 
van EVRM-rechten. Uiteindelijk zit dat in de hier 
opgenomen zaak wel goed, hoewel dat oordeel 
ook de andere kant op had kunnen uitvallen. Het 
lijkt er dan ook vooral op dat het EHRM richting 
de Luxemburgse collega even zijn tanden heeft 
willen laten zien als het erom gaat wie uiteinde-
lijk in Europa het laatste woord heeft als het gaat 
om grondrechtenbescherming. Zie in dit verband 
ook de speech van EHRM-president Raimondi bij 
de Hoge Raad op 18 november 2016 (zie onder 
meer  www.rechtspraak.nl ), die tegelijkertijd ook 
constateert dat er bij de twee Europese Hoven de 
wil bestaat om tot normatieve harmonisatie te 
komen, zij het dat hij zich nog steeds een warm 
voorstander toont van de toetreding van de EU tot 
het EHRM. De toekomst zal uitwijzen hoe deze 
ontwikkelingen verder gaan maar onze verwach-
ting is dat de beide hoven inhoudelijk verder naar 
elkaar toe zullen groeien als het gaat om grond-
rechtenbescherming, of er nu alsnog een toetre-
ding zal plaatsvinden of niet. De rol op het terrein 
van grondrechtenbescherming van het Hof van 
Justitie zal de komende jaren naar verwachting 
groter worden, mede door de toenemende bete-
kenis van het EU-Grondrechtenhandvest. Door de 
wederzijdse beïnvloeding zal er steeds meer een 
algemeen Europees grondrechtelijk acquis ont-
staan (vgl. Barkhuysen & Van Emmerik,  Europese 
grondrechten en het Nederlandse bestuursrecht , 
p. 151-152). 
 6. Deze uitspraak is ook verschenen in 
 EHRC 2016/187, m.nt. Glas & Krommendijk onder 
 EHRC 2016/183. 
 T. Barkhuysen en M.L. van Emmerik 
EU-handelingen tot nu toe steeds worden afge-
wezen. Alleen indien een klager evidente gebre-
ken aannemelijk weet te maken in de EU-men-
senrechtenbescherming lijkt er ruimte voor de 
nationale rechter en het EHRM voor een inhou-
delijke beoordeling van het concrete geval (EHRM 
30 juni 2005,  AB 2006/273 , m.nt. Barkhuysen & 
Van Emmerik ( Bosphorus t. Ierland )). Voorwaarde 
voor het aannemen van gelijkwaardige bescher-
ming lijkt wel dat het HvJ EU al een oordeel moet 
hebben gegeven over de vraag of de desbetref-
fende EU-handeling waaraan lidstaten uitvoering 
geven in overeenstemming is met de grondrech-
ten. Dit betekent dat de nationale rechter zo no-
dig de zaak prejudicieel heeft verwezen (EHRM 
6 december 2012,  NJ  2014/55 , m.nt. Myjer ( Mi-
chaud t. Frankrijk )). Is er echter bij de uitvoering 
van een EU-handeling beoordelingsmarge voor 
de lidstaten dan zal het EHRM het gebruik daar-
van op normale wijze toetsen. Zie in dit verband 
nader Barkhuysen & Widdershoven in:  AB Klas-
siek 2016/39 en T. Barkhuysen & M.L. van Em-
merik,  Europese grondrechten en het Nederlandse 
bestuursrecht. De betekenis van het EVRM en het 
EU-Grondrechtenhandvest , Deventer 2017, p. 19. 
 3. Naar de hier opgenomen uitspraak is 
door onder meer Straatsburgse ‘Court watchers’ 
reikhalzend uitgezien, nu het de eerste keer was 
na de Luxemburgse afwijzing van (de toetreding 
tot) het EVRM, dat het EHRM zich kon uitspre-
ken over de verhouding tussen het EU-recht 
en het EVRM. Uit de hier opgenomen uitspraak 
Avotins blijkt dat het Straatsburgse Hof onver-
kort vasthoudt aan de Bosphorus-presumptie, 
die onder twee voorwaarden van toepassing is: 
1) de EU-lidstaat in kwestie heeft geen beoorde-
lingsmarge ten aanzien van de tenuitvoerlegging 
van EU-recht; 2) het EU-toezichtmechanisme 
is ten volle benut (inclusief de mogelijkheid om 
een prejudicieel oordeel te vragen). Als aan deze 
voorwaarden is voldaan, gaat Straatsburg ervan 
uit dat er sprake is van een gelijkwaardige grond-
rechtenbescherming binnen het EU-systeem. Dit 
is alleen anders indien klager weet aan te tonen 
dat sprake is van ernstige gebreken bij deze be-
scherming, hetgeen het EHRM tot nu toe nooit 
heeft aangenomen (zie bijvoorbeeld ook EHRM 
20 januari 2009,  AB 2009/310 , m.nt. Barkhuysen 
& Van Emmerik ( Coöperatieve Producentenorga-
nisatie van de Nederlandse Kokkelvisserij t. Neder-
land )). 
 4. In de hier opgenomen uitspraak voegt 
het Hof aan de genoemde Bosphorus-lijn toe 
dat de hiervoor genoemde tweede voorwaarde, 
inhoudende dat het EU-toezichtstelsel ten volle 
wordt benut, niet betekent dat er altijd een preju-
diciële vraag moet worden gesteld. Deze eis moet 
volgens het Hof niet al te strikt worden toegepast, 
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